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Pros
 Portable old-age allowances empower the elderly 
and thus may help improve the quality of long-
term care services.
 Many elderly residents in long-term care 
institutions receive regular visits from family, who 
can be enlisted to help monitor service quality.
 Ombuds systems and adult guardianship could 
also be implemented more widely to monitor 
institutional long-term care services.
 New forms of nursing home architecture with 
individual homes for each resident offer more 
independence and could improve the quality of 
care and living standards.
ElEVatOR PitcH
The demand for institutional long-term care is likely to 
remain high in OECD countries, because of longer life 
expectancy and falling cohabitation rates of the elderly 
with family members. As shortages of qualified nurses 
put a cap on the supply of beds at nursing homes, excess 
demand builds. That puts upward pressure on prices, 
which may not reflect the quality of the services that are 
provided. Monitoring the quality of nursing home services 
is high on the agenda of OECD governments. Enlisting 
feedback from family visitors and introducing portable 
benefits might improve quality at little extra cost.
aUtHOR’S Main MESSaGE
Under conditions of excess demand, nursing home service providers have little incentive to improve quality. Regulations 
focus on inputs because outcomes are harder to monitor. One way to improve quality is to empower the elderly to 
monitor their own care by providing them with a flexible allowance to spend on either institutional or in-home care. 
Family members and other nursing home visitors could also be enlisted to report on specific indicators of service quality. 
Recruiting more young men and women to become nurses could ease supply constraints and strengthen incentives to 
improve quality. All of these options can be introduced at little additional cost.
cons
 The excess demand for nursing home residence 
is likely to worsen because of shortages of skilled 
nurses rather than because of any difficulties 
caused by regulatory requirements.
 Excess demand keeps prices high while offering 
little incentive to improve the quality of services 
offered.
 Portable allowances, if provided as cash benefits, 
may be appropriated by relatives of the elderly.
 New forms of nursing home architecture with 
individual living arrangements for each resident 
can be very expensive.
institutional long-term care and government regulation
Focus on family and portable allowances to lower the costs of 
institutional long-term care while monitoring its quality
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Source: Calculations based on OECD Health Statistics Data, 2013.
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MOtiVatiOn
With the number of elderly people in need of care projected to at least double by 2050, 
“governments are struggling to deliver high-quality care to people facing reduced functional 
and cognitive capabilities” [1]. The vast majority of beneficiaries of long-term institutional 
care are individuals of retirement age or older [2]. OECD governments spend about 1.6% of 
GDP on long-term care, and such spending has been growing at an average of 9% a year over 
the past decade, compared with 4% annual growth for overall public health expenditures [1]. 
Longer life expectancy and reduced cohabitation rates of the elderly with next of kin imply 
that the excess demand for nursing homes is likely to persist in most OECD countries. The 
problem is exacerbated by a shortage of skilled nurses. Under conditions of excess demand, 
nursing homes have little incentive to improve the quality of the services they provide. Better 
monitoring of the quality of institutional long-term care services thus becomes essential.
This paper focuses on institutional long-term care. It does not examine the determinants of 
the long-term care choices made by the dependent elderly nor does it investigate the scope 
for substitution between long-term care received at home and that received at a nursing 
home.
DiScUSSiOn OF PROS anD cOnS
the demand for institutional care
There are generally three residential options for the dependent elderly (ignoring the 
possibility of temporary hospitalization): living with family, living on their own and receiving 
home assistance, and living in a nursing home. The demand for nursing homes is greater 
the less capable the elderly are of providing their own care, the better the job opportunities 
available for women, and the higher the household income [3]. There is limited evidence that 
the wealthier elderly (who are often also healthier because of the strong positive correlation 
between wealth and health) have a preference for receiving home assistance over entering a 
nursing home, which is often viewed as a last resort option [3].
Aside from income, other factors that influence the choice of care options are the availability 
of public health subsidies (often covering only part of the costs of institutional long-term 
care) and the extent of family involvement in providing old-age care, which is affected by 
cultural norms. Early in the 20th century, it was common for elderly people, especially 
women, to live with their adult children or grandchildren. This arrangement served the 
interests of the adult child as well, since older women often provided unpaid household 
services and childcare [4]. However, due to rising incomes and changing cultural norms, 
co-residence rates have fallen dramatically [4]. This trend has gone hand in hand with the 
increased labor force participation and incomes of women. Government reform of survivor 
pensions and old-age benefits has also increased women’s old-age income [4]. While there 
has been an increase in multigenerational households as a result of the recent recession [5], 
demand for home assistance and nursing homes is likely to remain high in the coming years.
Projections of the number of elderly people who cannot perform the activities of daily living 
for themselves because of mental or physical impairments can be used to estimate how 
much increases in lifespan can be expected to raise demand for long-term care services. 
According to data from the Survey of Health Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE, 
a multidisciplinary survey covering more than 30,000 people aged 50 and over in many 
IZA World of Labor | August 2015 | wol.iza.org
3
ElEna StancanElli  |  Institutional long-term care and government regulation
  
different countries) roughly 20% of people over the age of 65 are physically impaired [2]. 
Assuming a continuing rising trend in life expectancy, the rate of physical impairment may 
remain constant or fall slightly if health outcomes improve [6].
Despite the narrowing gender gap in life expectancy at older ages (Figure 1), most users of 
nursing homes are single (often widowed) women (Figure 2) [4]. This is partly due to better 
health outcomes for women than men and to the age difference between spouses. Although 
the age gap between spouses has fallen over time, husbands are still about two years older 
than their wives, on average, in most OECD countries, and more than 80% of older people 
live together as a couple. Women typically provide informal care for their husband until he 
dies, and then, when independent living is no longer an option, enter a nursing home.
Figure 2, drawn from a representative sample of residents at French nursing homes in 2007, 
indicates that the average age of residents was 85 years and that 75% of residents were women 
Figure 1. Life expectancy in OECD countries is rising for both older men and older women,
2011 (or latest available)  
Source: Calculations based on OECD Health Statistics Data, 2013. Online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/health-data-en
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Figure 2. Descriptive statistics of the residents of nursing homes in France, 2007
Notes: a. A low standard deviation indicates that observations tend to be bunched close to the mean of the sample, 
while a high standard deviation indicates that the observations are more spread out. 
Source: Calculations based on data from Direction de la Recherche, des Etudes, de l’Evaluation et des Statistiques. 
Age (years)
Women
Widow
Has children or grandchildren
Number of children
Duration of stay (months)
Has an external advocate
Advocate is a relative
Receives visitors
Number of observations
Statistic Mean
85
75%
66%
73%
  1.94
64
20%
  6%
87%
3,464
Standard
deviationa
  9
43%
47%
44%
  1.89
72
40%
24%
34%
and 66% were widows. Moreover, 73% of the residents had children or grandchildren. The 
average number of children per resident was close to two (the count includes residents who 
had no children). About 87% of residents reported receiving visits from family and friends.
informal care and institutional care: complements or substitutes?
Generally, women provide the bulk of unpaid care in the household. The difference between 
men and women is smaller for adult care than for child care (Figure 3). Estimates of the time 
adult children spend caring for aging parents (in forgone employment and wages) are high 
[7]. While there is some substitution between informal care provided by family members 
and paid assistance at home, informal care is likely to be a limited substitute for nursing 
home care, as many nursing home residents require intensive medical care. Evidence from 
SHARE shows that informal care only weakly complements nursing home care [8].
improving the quality of institutional care while reducing its costs
Studies of nursing home quality and regulation note that the long-term care industry faces 
three main problems: the high and rising cost of nursing home care, concerns about the 
quality of the care, and the inability of poor people to afford it [9], [10].
Demand for nursing home care is rising faster than the supply. The supply of nursing homes 
includes public, private, and non-profit institutions. And while most OECD countries have 
a national licensing system for nursing homes, the main constraint to expanding nursing 
home beds appears to be the limited supply of qualified nurses rather than undue regulation 
[1]. Excess demand also constrains the scope for cost reduction.
The main cost faced by nursing homes is the cost of employing qualified nurses [9], [10]. 
Increasing the supply of qualified nurses would enable expanding the supply of nursing 
homes while increasing competition between nursing home providers.
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Figure 3. Women provide the bulk of unpaid adult care in the household
Source: Calculations based on data from OECD, Family Database. Online at: http://www.oecd.org/; and Eurofound,
Second European Quality of Life Survey, 2007. Online at: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/european-quality-of-life-
survey-2007
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Standard ways of monitoring the quality of institutional care
Concerns about quality are another of the major problems with nursing home care. Reports 
of abuse of nursing home residents are not uncommon [2]. But measuring the quality of 
nursing home services is challenging. While advances in computerization and the development 
of standard clinical measures of user outcomes have made it easier to standardize quality 
measures, collecting such data entails extra costs for providers in required staff skills and 
hours of work.
To overcome the weak incentives to improve the quality of nursing home care and the failure 
of providers to self-regulate, many governments impose external regulatory controls, which 
usually focus on controlling inputs (labor, infrastructure) by setting minimum acceptable 
standards and enforcing compliance [1]. Quality monitoring is often decentralized to local 
authorities. The main instruments for regulating input quality are licensure, accreditation, 
and standard setting. Variations in accreditation and inspection practices and frequency 
are considerable across OECD countries. Audits and inspections commonly find safety 
violations, unsuitability of premises, inadequate staff and staff training, and lack of regular 
assessment of residents’ needs and autonomy. In some countries, public reporting of audits 
is mandatory. Some countries use standardized assessment results, including residents’ 
assessment instruments, and audits, inspections, and other administrative data. For a given 
institution, the maximum capacity and the required skill level of the staff are also often 
regulated.
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Regulating the quality of outcomes for institutional long-term care is much less common. 
The ratio of qualified nurses to residents is one of the most widely used indicators of the 
quality of institutional long-term care quality (Figure 4). This is obviously a limited indicator 
of residents’ well-being. More precise quality measures rely on assessments of the clinical 
condition of patients and typically focus on the prevalence of depression, falls and fall-
related fractures, use of physical restraints, over-medication, and unplanned weight loss [1]. 
Dehydration is often a sign of mistreatment and neglect of residents.
However, regulations dealing with the clinical condition of residents may tempt nursing 
home providers to select only applicants in relatively good health in order to improve their 
clinical scores [11]. Excess demand makes this fairly easy to do. Another disadvantage of 
setting quality indicators based on clinical criteria is that providers may focus on meeting 
those criteria while neglecting other aspects of the services they provide. For example, 
nursing home providers may give less attention to illnesses that are not directly monitored 
or to recreational activities that are not part of the clinical criteria. Moreover, assessments 
are generally based on the average value of a series of clinical indicators rather than on 
each indicator individually. Thus providers may do very well on some indicators and very 
poorly on others and still receive an acceptable average score. And because nursing home 
residents do not always have their full cognitive capabilities, their subjective evaluations may 
not be reliable for monitoring the quality of services provided, though it is often argued that 
residents’ voice should receive more attention [12].
Figure 4. Long-term care workers as share of population aged 65 and older varies
considerably but is low in many countries, 2011 (or nearest year)
Notes: a. Data for Sweden, Spain, and the Slovak Republic do not distinguish long-term care workers in institutions
and at home.
Source: OECD Health Statistics Data, 2013. Online at: http://dx.doi.org /10.1787/health-data-en
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Alternative methods of monitoring quality
Thus the quality of nursing home services is difficult to monitor. The use of clinical reports 
for monitoring may induce providers to select only the healthiest applicants, while residents’ 
subjective reports may be compromised because of mental and physical impairments. 
However, many residents have regular visitors. These visiting family members and friends 
could be enlisted to provide regular evaluations of the services residents receive.
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Preliminary evidence using data from a representative survey of the population of nursing 
home residents in France (author’s calculations prepared for this paper) indicate that a large 
majority of the residents (about 87% of the sample) receive visits from family and friends. 
Moreover, individual measures of subjective well-being correlate positively with receiving 
visits and having an external advocate. It must be acknowledged, however, that causation 
may run either way: it could be that instead of social networks leading to better health, 
better health increases residents’ chances of having external contacts. There is also evidence 
drawn from SHARE that informal care can complement weak nursing home care. One study 
finds that adult children provide on average five hours a month of informal care to elderly 
parents, with adult children in Italy and Spain providing about 12 hours a month and adult 
children in Sweden about three hours [8].
Feedback from visitors could be systematized. They could receive a short one-page 
questionnaire to fill out along with a pre-stamped envelope addressed to the authority in 
charge of evaluating the quality of long-term institutional care. Visitors could be asked to 
report on aspects of nursing home care that have been identified as indicators of quality, 
such as overall cleanliness, safety, restraints on the resident’s movement, improvement 
or deterioration in the resident’s health (including falls and fractures due to falls, any 
unintentional weight loss, signs of depression, dehydration, and sleeping problems, and any 
sign of under-treatment or over-medication). Related methods used to monitor long-term 
care services in some OECD countries include ombuds systems and adult guardianship [1]. 
The success of these practices suggests that family links could help in monitoring the quality 
of nursing homes.
Flexible or “portable” cash benefits have also been identified as a means of empowering the 
elderly and enabling them to affect the quality of the long-term care services they receive [2], 
[13]. People can choose how to spend their cash allowance, either for nursing home care or 
for assistance at home. Having the resources to make this choice could affect the quality of 
long-term care by enabling the elderly to switch from one nursing home to another or from 
one type of care to another in response to quality differences. Examples of cash benefits 
are the German Cash Allowance for Care, which is received by about one-fifth of elderly 
dependents in Germany, and the French Old-Age Benefit, which is universal but varies 
in amount with the recipient’s physical and financial resources. Some countries, such as 
Sweden, provide monetary allowances to family members for providing informal care to the 
dependent aged.
The main drawback with portable cash benefits is that they can easily be appropriated by 
family members and used for other purposes than intended. New forms of portable benefits 
that are flexible enough to allow the dependent elderly to use them to direct their own care 
but that are not necessarily in the form of cash may be needed to avoid these shortcomings.
Finally, modern nursing home designs that provide semi-independent living facilities 
resembling individual homes for each resident have also been introduced in some countries. 
These are proposed as a means to improve the living standards and well-being of long-term 
residents, preserving their right to privacy and to a life of their own [12]. Such projects have 
received considerable attention in the Netherlands, where the buurtzorg (neighborhood care) 
model has been very successful in providing home care that relies on nurses working directly 
with the elderly, their families, and the local community. This Dutch model entrusts nurses 
with considerable autonomy and responsibility, thus reducing some of the administrative 
time and cost burden of care. The same principles could be applied to new nursing home 
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complexes in which residents have a home of their own and nurses work together with 
the residents and the medical staff, such as the non-profit Green House Project in the US. 
The Dutch buurtzorg model could be extended to a nursing home setting. It might also be 
possible in some cases to substitute qualified care workers for nurses, to relieve shortages of 
qualified nurses and lower the cost of this new type of nursing home arrangement.
impediments to new methods of quality improvements
Family members may be reluctant to report honestly on the quality of long-term care if 
they feel that there are no feasible alternatives for their dependent elderly or if they believe 
that the quality of long-term care cannot be improved without incurring higher costs. This 
makes it all the more important to increase the supply of qualified nurses, so that supply 
shortages can be alleviated, giving the elderly and their families more options for long-term 
care providers.
Portable benefits that enable the elderly to select among different providers of long-term 
care services might have little impact on the standard of services provided as long as 
there is excess demand for these services. Moreover, fully flexible cash allowances may be 
appropriated by relatives, especially under conditions of a shortage of qualified workers. 
Placing too many restrictions on the use of the cash allowance to avoid such abuses is likely 
also to reduce their beneficial effects by making it difficult for the elderly and their families 
to use the benefits to select the best care option available. Therefore, new forms of non-
cash, portable, and flexible long-term care benefits may be needed.
liMitatiOnS anD GaPS
Because the focus of this paper is institutional long-term care, it is not an exhaustive review 
of the literature on long-term care for the elderly. It does not examine the determinants of 
long-term care choices or the scope for substitution between long-term home care and 
long-term nursing home care. The choice of type of care depends in part on the medical 
condition of the dependent elderly person, and independent living is often correlated with 
better health outcomes [12]. Home care services are thought to be less expensive, which 
may be partly due to the more intensive assistance and costly medical care often required 
by nursing home residents.
Improving and monitoring the quality of nursing homes appears to be more pressing than 
measuring home care quality or informal care provided by relatives, because more severe 
abuses are reported for nursing home residents than for other forms of long-term care [2]. 
Whether this is due to selection into nursing homes of the most dependent elderly, with 
greater physical and mental challenges, is hard to determine because of the limited evidence 
available. Most surveys do not focus on the elderly and those that do consider only a single 
category, either nursing homes or home care. The evidence to date on the effectiveness of 
portable benefits and systems of guardianship to improve the quality of nursing home care 
is also scant. More evaluation studies are needed in this area.
Finally, there may be large differences in the quality of public, private, and non-profit 
providers of nursing home services. Although there is evidence for the US that demand for 
nursing home services is inelastic with respect to changes in the public health insurance 
system for the indigent elderly (Medicaid), it has been found that under conditions of excess 
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demand, a 1% increase in quality would crowd out 3.2% of Medicaid patients in nursing 
homes.
SUMMaRY anD POlicY aDVicE
Monitoring and improving the quality of institutional long-term care is challenging. 
Nevertheless, from the studies discussed here it is possible to draw some tentative policy 
recommendations to improve the monitoring and quality of long-term care at little extra 
cost.
Portable old-age benefits, introduced by some OECD countries, empower the elderly to 
direct more of their own long-term care and may also improve the quality of long-term care 
services. These portable allowances should be fully flexible and should not be paid in cash, 
to avoid expropriation by others.
Many residents of long-term care institutions receive regular visits from family and friends. 
These visitors could be encouraged to help monitor the services provided by these institutions 
by reporting on their experiences in surveys. The ombuds systems and adult guardianship 
programs that some countries have implemented to monitor long-term care should be 
fostered more widely.
Nursing home arrangements that provide residents with individual living accommodations 
may also improve the quality of services, though keeping costs low may be more challenging 
in this setting. The Dutch buurtzorg (neighborhood care) model that gives nurses more 
autonomy to work with the families and the local community to reduce administrative costs 
of home care might be extended to more complex nursing home settings in which residents 
live somewhat independently.
The main cost facing nursing homes is that of employing qualified nurses [9], [10]. Increasing 
the supply of qualified nurses would enable nursing homes to expand services, while also 
increasing competition among nursing home providers, which should improve quality. 
During the current period of high unemployment in many OECD countries, it should be 
possible to increase the supply of nurses without having to pay higher wages by encouraging 
young men and women to take up nursing education [13]. To make the profession more 
attractive, career prospects should also be improved. In parallel, social workers could be 
qualified and trained to provide some care to the elderly, at lower cost than nurses.
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